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Abstract 
We present a risk analysis approach for selecting alternate routes between liquefaction and re-gasification terminals. Due to lack 
of data related to incidents directly affecting LNG vessels as a result of the impressive historical safety records of the LNG 
industry, some parameters required for our risk analysis are estimated from a closely related hazmat cargo, Crude Oil. Our 
formulation is then used to solve a problem instance, using real-life data. Our results suggest: i) Depending on managerial 
preference, an alternate route with shorter distance may not necessarily be the vessel route of choice; ii) Risk analysis approach 
provides an insight into selection of a voyage route, taking into consideration activities (terrorism, or pirate attacks, or otherwise) 
that have been historically associated with alternate LNG vessel routes. 
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1. Introduction 
The global Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) trade is expected to grow due to readily available supplies of gas 
worldwide and the renewed enforcement of a global climate regime [1]. More recently, the success of the oil and gas 
industry in terms of technological advances, especially with the advent of efficient fracking techniques have made it 
easier to access oil and gas deposits in hitherto difficult formations such as shale rocks. 
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Apart from the identification of the improvement of existing technology in the storage, production and 
distribution of LNG as essential requirements for the continued success of the industry, the industry’s existing safety 
performance, especially in handling and transportation between regional markets are key factors contributing to the 
growth of global LNG trade that need to be sustained. As most of the confirmed gas reserves are located far away 
from their demand markets and usually between continents, it is apparent that maritime transportation will continue 
to play a pivotal role in the LNG trade.  
2. Problem statement 
Since LNG often has to be transported over long distances across maritime infrastructures to their final 
destinations, safety along these sea routes is of paramount importance.  Although historical records strongly indicate 
the involvement of LNG carriers in accidents to be negligible in comparison to other types of vessels [2], the 
consequent economic and catastrophic losses that may occur when a single vessel is involved in an accident needs to 
be accorded great attention. In this paper, we apply a risk-based methodology to the LNG routing problem presented 
in [3]. 
In Risk parlance, risk is taken as the expected consequence of incidents. Calculation of expected consequence is 
conditioned on the types of possible incidents [4]: 
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The two components of equation (1) respectively refer to the expected consequence given the occurrence of an 
incident j, and the probability that an incident of type j occurs. However, a successful intrusion (attack) may or may 
not lead to an incident. Hence, equation (1) can be written as ([4], [5], etc.):  
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The newly introduced conditional probability in equation (2) is the probability of a successful attack/intrusion 
given that the attack has already occurred and the last term is the probability of the occurrence of the attack k.  
In sequence, the probabilities in equation (2) are respectively referred to as Expected consequence of an incident 
C,  Vulnerability of targeted assets/infrastructure V, and Probability that an attack (activity) occurs T in the 
quantification of risk ([4],[5], [6], [7], etc.). 
3. Methodology- Risk-based LNG routing 
In order not to disrupt the flow of presentation in this paper, the details of our modified risk-based formulation of 
[3]’s model are presented in the appendix. 
In our methodology, LNG spillage is identified as a consequence due to the following compelling reasons: 
 
x Compared to other indices such as ship damage and fatality (related to human lives), spillage can be easily 
quantified and its economic effects can be readily computed with widely available data. 
x LNG spillage through the compromise of vessel cargo containment can be attributed to other vessel accident 
scenarios such as collision, grounding and Contacts. In fact, [2] identifies the culpability of these three generic 
scenarios in about 90% of total risk related to LNG carriers. 
 
Since risk information for rare events inherently suffers from sparseness of accident data, expert judgment is 
often used in developing frequency data for risk analysis ([8], [9], etc.). However, experts’ biases and individual 
experiences may affect the integrity of information recommended. Moreover, the information at their disposal will 
usually be solely based on their past experiences and may be inadequate in predicting the occurrence of future 
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incidents. In the alternative, we propose the use and integration of data available from the transport of a closely 
related cargo vessel (Oil Tanker vessels) in our methodology. 
In recognition of the past reliance on LNG imports by the US economy as well the future expansion of US LNG 
exports, the US Department of Energy (DOE) has funded several studies related to the large scale spillage of LNG. 
As a part of these studies, spillage as a result of accidental or intentional breach of LNG cargo tanks has been 
studied in [10]. Parameters required as inputs in our methodology can be readily obtained from this study. 
3.1. Risk estimation model and assessment 
In accordance with the terminologies adopted in the Risk literature and our specific problem, the first two 
conditional probabilities in equation (2) are ‘the expected consequence given the occurrence of a spill incident j’ and 
‘conditional probability of a spill occurrence given that the breach (in the LNG cargo containment system) has 
already occurred’ respectively, and the last term is ‘the probability of a breach(in the LNG cargo containment 
system) occurrence’.  
Risk on a route rt can be computed thus: 
   rt rt rt
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 ¦   (3) 
It should be noted that since neither of the risk component in equation (2) is strictly a function of the same index 
(j and k in equation 2), an index w of set W is introduced to indicate this. In reality, the risk components on a route 
are not homogenous. Therefore, we use segments to represent route subdivisions where a route is made of 
segments/portions/zones l, l+1,……,q. Hence, risk on a segment l is: 
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For ease of notation, we drop subscript rt and the expected consequence for segment l+1 ([11]) is: 
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where set W2 represents the set of activities (breaches) that do not result into LNG spillage. 
Likewise, the expected consequence on segment l+2 is: 
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Hence, total Expected consequence on route rt with a total number of q segments is then: 
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Based on studies in [10], spill events considered are: ‘Small/No spill m’, ‘Medium spills M’, and ‘Large spills L’. 
Since the consequence of low breach size typically falls within current spill detection and safety systems on Moss 
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and Membrane LNG ships ([10]), we reasonably assume an LNG vessel continues to travel except when a medium 
or large breach occurs (implying the occurrence of a small breach doesn’t terminate the voyage).  
Therefore, spill risk on route rt,  
,
M M M
route rt
L L LRisk C TCV T V    (9) 
And spill risk on a segment l is 
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Expected consequence for segment l+1 is: 
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Likewise, expected consequence for segment l+2 is: 
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And total Expected consequence on route rt with a total number of q segments is then: 
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3.2. Expected consequence of a spill event 
Apart from loss of cargo, the incident of LNG spillage can lead to pool fires, damage to vessel steel structures (as 
a result of cryogenic LNG flow and high temperature due to extensive fires), large fires, human casualty, etc. ([10]). 
While all these are identified as possible consequences of LNG spillage, only the loss of cargo consequence can be 
readily ascertained without extensive use of complex estimation models or large scale expensive experimental 
procedures. Using the loss of cargo criterion, all that is needed is the volume of cargo as well as its current market 
price (or price hitherto agreed to in the contractual agreements). Hence, for our purpose, we consider the expected 
consequence of LNG spillage as the cost per billion cubic meters bcm cost of cargo spill (to include cargo loss, 
contract penalty –if any, regulatory environmental fee–if any, etc.).  
It should be noted that different quantitative models have been developed for the cost involved in cleaning crude 
oil spills (e.g. in [12], [13], etc.). However, unlike Oil spills, there is no need for environmental clean-up of LNG 
spills because the liquid will quickly evaporate, thus making the environmental cleaning of LNG spills unnecessary. 
LNG Spill size volume as a function of breach volume extracted from experimental results presented in [10] is 
shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Spill size volume as a function of breach volume [10]. 
Spill Size LNG Flow Rate Loss Volume Rate Loss per time t 
Small 0.001X > < 0.001Xt 
Medium ~ 0.167X ~ 0.167Xt 
Large Spill X Xt 
where X is the volume of LNG cargo 
3.3. Vulnerability of LNG Vessel 
The probability of a successful breach on a vessel (and by extension, its tanks) cannot be easily ascertained. The 
double-hull feature and other features on the vessel suggest minimal intrusion in the case of small collisions. 
However, a deliberate attack on vessel, a severe unexpected inclement weather, grounding or collision with very 
large vessels is expected to result into high probabilities of successful breaches. 
For our purpose in this paper, we estimate the probability thus: 
 
x Identify an acceptable division of alternate sea routes between origin ports and regasification terminal using 
division of world oceans (navigated by the LNG vessels) into 31 zones as done in [9]. In the alternative, the 
approach adopted in [11] where route sub-sections are determined by lines of longitude and latitudes will also 
suffice. 
x Depending on the events under consideration, a database of events is obtained and its contents analyzed. The 
database (related to piracy attacks) we use is that made available in [14].   
x For each segment in the route, a corresponding probability is computed based on a utility function; with the 
events having the highest frequency assigned a vulnerability of 1 or a probability close to 1. 
3.4. LNG Spillage- Probability of breach occurrence 
Ideally and in accordance with accepted risk methodologies, this probability should be obtained from historic 
safety data in LNG shipping and is usually computed as incident frequency per ship year (e.g. in [15]) 
Without access to such recent data, we use data presented in [2] and identify the ‘failure of cargo containment 
system’ as a specific accident category related to LNG spillage. Amongst other reasons, the category is chosen from 
intuition. Moreover, the referenced paper clearly identified it as an incident that could have resulted from other 
categories such as grounding, collision and contacts. Thus, ilT from equations 7 - 14 can then be estimated thus: 
i
lT   = *    frequency per ship yeariD  (15) 
    ,where i M L   
 = * 0.0095iD  (16) 
Again, due to lack of historic data on LNG spills, we make use of oil tanker spill statistics compiled by the 
International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, ITOPF [17] to approximate iD . While we acknowledge that the 
two spillages are fundamentally different, we rationalize that spill category based on volume of oil spillage as 
reported by ITOPF is similar to the LNG spill types we have adopted and the proportions of these categories in both 
spill situations are analogous because liquid natural gas handling is more like handling oil [16]. 
Table 2. Comparison: LNG Spill Types [10] versus ITOPF oil spill sizes [17]. 
LNG Spill types Oil Spill Size equivalents (from ITOPF) 
Small Spill <7 tonnes (<50 bbls) 
Medium Spill 7–700 tonnes (50–5,000 bbls) 
Large Spill 700 tonnes (>5,000 bbls) 
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The ITOPF data includes the type of oil spilt, the spill amount, the cause and location of the incident and the 
vessel involved. Although the actual amount spilt is also recorded, the spill size categorized is as shown in Table 2. 
With about 10,000 incidents, the vast majority of all incidents (81%) fall under the smallest category i.e. <7 tonnes 
[17]. In the absence of specific LNG spill data for the failure of cargo containment system, we use available data on 
oil spills related to historical spillage from 1970-2013 and approximate iD  based on data presented in [17]. 
 
 
 
4. Computational study- Case study results 
We present results using a modification of the test case described in [3]. While the liquefaction plant is a country 
in the Middle East, required depots to be served are located in North America, Europe, and South America. Data 
presented in [3] such as the specification of LNG tankers, customer demands in each time periods and other 
parameters are maintained. Where applicable, data presented for the first three customer demands in the terminals 
are maintained to coincide with the three customers identified in this paper. However, distance (in Nautical miles 
Nm) and computed raw risk data (based on section 3) in this case study are shown in Table 3. In addition, 
uncertainties as a result of boil off gas BOG introduced in [3] are excluded in the implementation presented in this 
paper. 
The model is implemented in GAMS and solved using CPLEX. All MIPs are solved within a relative tolerance of 
3% duality gap, and all computational runs are made on a 3.00 GHz Intel Xeon machine with 400 GB of memory, 
running CPLEX version. 
 
Table 3. Distance (and raw risk data) between depot and liquefaction terminals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) Sample Delivery Schedule; (b) Objective function versus decision maker’s preference. 
 
Hence 0.1351,1351 0.045945910000 1 .0000M LD D     
 Routes Terminal 2 Terminal 3 Terminal 4 
Depot Route 1 9789 (0.000453) 5028 (0.000294) 8376 (0.000423) 
 Route 2 12597 (0.000324) 10165 (0.000384) 9540 (0.000268) 
Terminal 2 Route 1  4781(0.000048) 5663 (0.000050) 
 Route 2  5259 (0.000095) 6229 (0.000019) 
Terminal 3 Route 1   4512 (0.000108) 
 Route 2   - 
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Results obtained for the case study is summarized below: 
 
x Irrespective of decision maker preference, choice of route between ‘the depot and terminal 3’, ‘terminal 2 and 
terminal 3’, ‘terminal 3 and terminal 4’ are always the same, given that such a voyage is included in the optimal 
delivery plan. While only a single route option exists in the latter voyage, distance and risk considerations favor a 
particular alternate route in the former voyages. 
x However for all other voyages (apart from those identified above), choice of the alternate routes is dependent on 
the decision maker’s preference. Again, this is applicable if the particular voyage is included in the optimal 
delivery plan returned by the model. Figure 1(a) shows a sample optimized 6 month delivery schedule/routing 
plan from D+1 to D+192. See [3] for more clarification. In addition, alternate choice of voyage route is indicated. 
x Figure 1(b) indicates that the appropriate choice of λ for the case study lies between 0.4 and 0.6. Neglecting 
either of the two terms in the objective function (see Appendix) doesn’t give the least aggregated cost.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a framework for risk-based transportation of LNG vessels. Due to lack of data as a 
result of the current lofty safety records in the LNG transportation industry, some parameters were estimated from 
Crude oil, a similar petrochemical energy resource. Afterwards, we integrated the described risk methodology into 
the model described in [3] and used our methodology to solve a realistic sample case study.  
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Appendix A. Mathematical model of Risk-based LNG Vehicle Routing Problem 
A.1. Indices and sets, variables, parameters, objective functions and constraints 
In addition to the indices included in [3], we add the index rt RT  defined thus 
RT  Set of alternative routes from i to j 
rt RT  Index of alternative routes 
Hence, 1, ,i j kx   as defined in [3] is re-defined as 
1
, , ,i j k rtx
 
^ `             ,  ;, , \Binary variable to represent whether the arc from to by vessel typekusing route rti i V j j V i 
 
And all other variables remain as defined in the reference paper. In addition to parameters defined in [3], the 
following parameters are included:  
, ,i j rtnDAY  (Normalized) Estimated travel distance (nautical miles) from i to  j using route rt 
, ,i j rtnRisk  (Normalized) Aggregated Risk consequence on alternative route, rt (give units) 
λ Decision maker preference (between 0 and 1) 
The objective function (aggregated cost) is redefined thus:  
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All constraints presented in [3] still remain applicable, albeit with the new indexing and variable 
declarations taken into consideration. For example, equation (2) in the reference paper becomes: 
 
1
, 1 , , 0s s S t k rt
rt RT k K
x  
 
 ¦ ¦   ^ ` , \ 1s S t T     (A2) 
And equation (16) becomes: 
1
, , , ,i j r i j r rty VC xDt    , , ,i j A r K rt RT    , (A3) 
In addition, the following constraints become applicable: 
 
 
 1, , , 1i j k rt
rt RT
x

 ¦   , ,i j A k K    (A4)  
The additional constraint, A4 ensures only a single route is chosen for any voyage. 
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